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Does International Recognition Matter?
Support for Unilateral Secession in Catalonia and Scotland
Abstract: 
How much do the prospects of international recognition of a possible new state affect the domestic 
support for secession? To answer this research question, we adopted a most similar systems design 
and conducted a web-based survey experiment in Catalonia and Scotland. Respondents were 
presented with plausible scenarios regarding the international recognition of a hypothetical 
independent state by other countries, and were subsequently asked whether they would support a 
unilateral declaration of independence. The results show that the prospects of international 
recognition as a sovereign and independent state influence the degree of support for a unilateral 
declaration of independence in both cases. This effect was moderated by the intensity of nationalist 
sentiment and the motivations for independence. Respondents with more outspoken nationalist 
sentiments were only marginally influenced by these scenarios or treatments. Moreover, 
participants whose preferences toward secession were driven by ethno-political motivations were 
less influenced by international factors than those who wanted an independent state for economic 
or political reasons.
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Secession, Catalonia, Scotland, Survey Experiment, Nationalism, Europe  
Page 1 of 43 Nations and Nationalism
-2-
I don´t want to be the President of Freedonia. I refuse to walk around the world, handing out 
business cards of a Republic that doesn´t exist.
Catalan President Carles Puigdemont during a cabinet meeting discussing a 
possible unilateral declaration of independence in October 2017 (García, 2018, 
p.216)
INTRODUCTION
On 27 October 2017, the Catalan Parliament adopted a resolution to unilaterally declare 
Catalonia’s independence from Spain and the foundation of a Catalan Republic. As the quote 
above illustrates, the regional premier feared that an independent Catalonia would lack 
international recognition and thus be analogous to the fictitious country of Freedonia, as in the 
Marx Brothers’ movie Duck Soup. President Puigdemont’s apprehension of Catalonia becoming a 
small and isolated Freedonia was justified, given the messages conveyed by the international 
community. The President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani made clear that ‘no one in 
the European Union will recognise this declaration’, whereas the US State Department affirmed 
that ‘Catalonia is an integral part of Spain, and the United States supports the Spanish 
government’s constitutional measures to keep Spain strong and united’ (Tajani, 2017; US State 
Department, 2017). Most political parties favouring a secession from Spain had assumed that 
gaining independence would go hand in hand with retaining or acquiring EU membership, but 
Brussels was quick to signal its lack of appetite for new enlargements, whether ‘external’ or 
‘internal’ (Closa 2016: 243-244).
On the day of the unilateral declaration of independence, the Spanish Government imposed 
temporary direct rule over the Autonomous Community of Catalonia and called for fresh elections. 
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Four days later, the declaration was fully suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court, and 
various members of the Catalan government had either fled the country or were awaiting legal 
prosecution for rebellion, sedition, disobedience and embezzlement of public money. Various 
accounts and political analyses of the ‘Catalan process’ highlight the lack of international support 
and the difficulty in combining secession and immediate EU accession as some of the key reasons 
for the regional government’s reluctance to proceed with its unilateral agenda (Muro, 2018; García, 
2018, p.215,  p.240). The above-mentioned episode illustrates that the Catalan secessionist process 
was not a purely internal issue but a phenomenon with both domestic and international dimensions. 
Indeed, the formation of new states is usually preceded by a domestic push for separation, but their 
full recognition depends on the will of consolidated states to acknowledge the existence of the 
newcomer. 
Scholarly research has discussed how international factors influence the dynamics of secessionism 
and the emergence of new states (Coggins, 2011; Fazal and Griffiths, 2014; Cunningham and 
Sawyer, 2017; Griffiths and Muro, 2020). These studies have identified the factors and 
mechanisms that explain why foreign powers may support secessionist movements and why some 
states gain international recognition – the latter widely seen as one of the key features of a 
sovereign state (Coggins, 2011; Fabry, 2010; Fazal and Griffiths, 2014) – while others stay in the 
limbo of being a ‘contested state’, namely an entity lacking international recognition of its status 
as an independent state. Little scholarly attention, however, has been devoted to the question of 
how international recognition may affect domestic support for secessionist movements. While 
most studies approach secessionist movements as units of analysis, the attitudes of the general 
population that make up the contested nations have been conspicuously absent. One notable 
exception is provided by the work of Nadav G. Shelef and Yael Zeira on the impact of the United 
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Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) 2012 recognition of Palestine on mass attitudes toward a 
two-state solution (Shelef and Zeira, 2015). Their work used a combination of panel data and a 
survey experiment to make the argument that international recognition by the UNGA shaped 
Palestinian attitudes toward territorial compromise in two ways: international recognition 
simultaneously increased support for partition as a strategy of conflict resolution as well as 
decreasing support for compromise on the territorial terms of partition. However, ‘who’ was 
specifically influenced by international signals and ‘why’ they were influenced by them were 
questions that remained largely unanswered in the paper. 
In similar fashion, Muro and Vlaskamp (2016) explored how the perspectives of European Union 
(EU) membership influenced the micro-foundations of support for independence in Scotland and 
Catalonia. Their study measured the impact of positive and negative information treatments on the 
prospects of EU membership, and concluded that positive incentives changed support for 
independence, whereas threats and sanctions produced null effects, especially in the Scottish case. 
Their research design did not take into account the fact that, in contrast to Spain’s opposition to 
Catalonia holding an independence referendum, the UK adopted a more accommodating position, 
making the threat about EU exclusion less credible. The British government’s strategic calculation 
had been that the Scottish referendum was a low-risk option, given that opinion polls suggested 
that only 30% of the Scottish public supported independence. The vote on independence was thus 
seen as an opportunity to deliver a substantial defeat for the ruling SNP, strengthen the democratic 
credentials of the UK, and annihilate demand for independence for a generation. The strategy 
clearly backfired and future governments are likely to adopt a more restrictive position, given that 
both the Scottish and Brexit referendums proved to be high-risk strategies for the incumbent party. 
Following the UK’s probable departure from the EU in 2019, the Conservative and Labour parties 
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may find new electoral incentives to oppose a second Scottish referendum and argue that ‘now is 
not the time’ (Cetrà and Harvey, 2018, p.8).
As in the case of the failed Catalan Republic, nationalist leaders may be tempted to declare 
independence unilaterally if they believe that an agreed secession with the host state is not feasible 
in the short term and that there is sufficient domestic support for a new sovereign state. Needless 
to say, not all supporters of secession may be willing to assume the political and economic risks 
of unilateral decisions and may prefer long-term bilateral agreements. This paper contributes to 
the existing literature on secession by studying the extent to which the prospects of international 
recognition of the entity as a new state (or the lack thereof) influence popular support for a 
unilateral declaration of independence. In other words, it examines the extent to which individuals 
feel supported or restrained from taking this leap in the dark by international factors. By using data 
from a web-based survey experiment including 2,400 participants interviewed in Catalonia and 
Scotland, we show the effect of international threats and incentives on preferences for secession, 
especially among individuals with mixed national and regional identities. The results clearly 
suggest that the prospects of international recognition influenced popular support for a unilateral 
declaration of independence in both cases. However, the effects of these credible scenarios for and 
against independence were not homogeneously distributed and were moderated by the individual’s 
degree of nationalist sentiment. First of all, the more nationalist participants were only marginally 
influenced by the hypothetical situations (or treatments). Second, respondents whose preference 
for an independent state were driven by ethno-political motivations were less influenced by 
international factors than respondents who favoured secession for economic or political reasons. 
In other words, different types of people were influenced differently, which improved our 
knowledge of the conditions under which international threats and sanctions work.
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The article is structured as follows: First, we discuss the relationship between domestic support 
for secession and international recognition and introduce the four hypotheses to be tested. Second, 
we describe the online survey experiment and justify the rationale for case selection, which adopts 
a Most Similar Systems Design. Third, we present the results of the experiment and discuss the 
role of international incentives on social and political demands for self-determination. We finally 
summarise the findings and discuss their policy implications.  
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AND DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR SECESSION 
Secession is understood as a ‘process of withdrawal of a territory and its population from an 
existing state and the creation of a new state on that territory’ (Radan and Pavkovic, 2011, p.1). 
For new states, the easiest route to obtaining international recognition is to secede with the 
permission of the former metropole or central government. Once the former host state recognises 
the new state, the rest of the international community usually follows rather quickly. In the recent 
past, such mutually agreed secessions were usually preceded by a referendum in which the 
population voted its preference (e.g. in Montenegro or South Sudan). However, such a scenario is 
more the exception than the rule, and in most cases the metropole is vehemently opposed to 
secession for reasons such as emotional attachment, fear of a snowball-effect, a sense of injustice, 
or economic motives (Coggins, 2011; Sterio, 2012; Griffiths, 2016; Ker-Lindsay, 2012). If the host 
state does not recognise the act of secession and the constitution of a new state, we can speak of a 
unilateral secession. Historically, only about half of the world’s new states had the former home 
state’s consent to secede (Coggins, 2011, p.446). In these cases of unilateral secession, there can 
be a discrepancy between ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ states, depending on whether the state legally 
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exists, regardless of the practical situation on the ground, or exists in reality but lacks recognition 
by other states.  
Since the end of World War II, de facto and juridical sovereignty have been clearly decoupled, 
something that has caused the emergence of so-called ‘contested states’ lacking international 
recognition; for example, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Somaliland or Northern Cyprus (Fabry, 2010; 
Florea, 2014). Most former host states use all tools at their disposal (from diplomacy to war) to 
prevent the broader recognition of these contested states. In some cases, the hope is that the 
secession can still be undone, as was the case with Katanga (Zaire, present-day Democratic 
Republic of the Congo), the Confederate States of America, or the short-lived Catalan Republic. 
In other cases, promoting the international isolation of the new state is a tool of retaliation or a 
way to force the new state’s government to renegotiate the terms of secession in a more orderly 
manner (Ker-Lindsay, 2012, p.70ff). In the eyes of both proponents and opponents of secession, 
international recognition is a unilateral political act taken by another country or international 
institution, which affects the domestic support for political independence.
The hypotheses guiding this paper are concerned with the research question of how the prospects 
of international recognition influence individuals’ political attitudes towards unilateral secession. 
Since neither the Scottish referendum nor the ‘Catalan process’ have settled the territorial issue, 
the possibility that any of these two stateless nations (or any other region of an EU state) might 
initiate new bids towards secession in the future cannot be ruled out. Independence referendums 
will continue to be rare events in advanced industrial democracies, but this will not discourage 
secessionist movements from initiating similar bids towards independence (McEwen and Keating, 
2017). Movements in favour of remedial secession will likely ponder over the costs and benefits 
of unilateral actions, while keeping a close eye on the preferences of big powers. Thus, the first 
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and second hypotheses sought to test whether the prospects of international recognition would 
have an effect on support for a process of secession that was not negotiated with the host state: 
H1: The prospect of international recognition will have a positive effect on support for a 
unilateral declaration of independence.
H2: The prospect of lacking international recognition will have a negative effect on support 
for a unilateral declaration of independence.
The rationale for these hypotheses is that domestic audiences might perceive international support 
as an indicator of the feasibility of the unilateral separatist project, hence making a positive 
contribution to the cause. Under conditions of uncertainty, political support of great powers (or the 
absence of it) can make or break new states. As suggested by Sterio, we understand the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Russia, China, France and the 
United Kingdom), three of the four remaining G8-members (Germany, Italy and Japan) and India 
as Great Powers (Sterio, 2012, p.44ff). While support and recognition of individual states can keep 
‘contested states’ economically alive (e.g. Turkey’s support of Northern Cyprus), it may not be 
enough to provide unrecognised states with the necessary financial capabilities to serve their 
populations effectively and act as responsible members of the international community. Support 
from great powers is important, as ‘their recognition carries the greatest weight and has the greatest 
potential influence on others. Typically early movers, the decision of great powers to acknowledge 
a new state serves as a focal point that initiates a cascade of legitimacy throughout the system’s 
remaining members’ (Coggins, 2011, p.449). Major powers may also apply pressure on the host 
state to recognise the new state (Paquin, 2010), especially in cases of ‘remedial secession’, where 
there is systematic oppression or exploitation. For example, due to domestic anticolonial 
sentiments and geostrategic considerations, in 1949 the United States threatened the Netherlands 
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with exclusion from the Marshall Plan if it did not accept Indonesia’s independence (Kromhout, 
2001). Furthermore, as Saideman points out, ‘secessionist movements that gain recognition can 
join international organizations, get finances from regional and world financial institutions and 
generally join the club of countries. Those that do not get diplomatic recognition dwell in an 
ambiguous situation where informal economic exchanges tend to predominate’ (Saideman, 2011, 
p.267). Especially for small states, access to international financial institutions, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), can be crucial to their economic viability (Fazal and Griffiths, 
2014). 
In other words, the perspective of being a ‘contested state’ or one with limited recognition and a 
high degree of legal and economic insecurity may tilt the balance in favour of the host state. As 
James Ker-Lindsay (2012) has persuasively argued, there is evidence that strategies of ‘counter 
secession’ use fears about the international isolation of a hypothetical new state in their campaigns 
in favour of the status quo. The prospect of international recognition, however, may embolden 
secessionist supporters and put an end to existing concerns about the feasibility of the new state. 
Whereas the first and second hypotheses sought to test the impact of international incentives on 
the entire population, the third and fourth hypotheses aimed to identify the mechanisms that drive 
these results. More specifically, the third hypothesis aimed to find out if individuals with fixed 
political preferences reflected on the international environment, or whether they held inelastic 
political inclinations despite rising costs (e.g. the risk of becoming a pariah state). We follow the 
literature on secession in assuming that support for independence is largely a function of regional 
and/or national identity (Sorens, 2005). Although demands for secession do not necessarily stem 
from the identity-based distinctiveness of groups, national identity/ies are usually considered the 
main driving factor of independence support in both the Scottish and Catalan cases (McCrone and 
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Paterson, 2002; Serrano, 2013). We took the self-reported degree of nationalist sentiment as a 
proxy for political preferences for (or against) secession and we follow Anthony D. Smith in 
defining nationalism as ‘an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity 
and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or 
potential ‘nation’’ (Smith, 1991, p.73). 
The scholarly basis for Hypothesis 3 relied on the literature of partisan identification as a 
‘perceptual screen’ (Campbell et al, 1960, p.133), which shapes the attitudes of individuals 
towards political objects. According to the research on public opinion, parties structure the political 
debate and provide citizens with cues that help them to establish their preferences. For example, 
individuals react differently to similar cases of corruption, depending on whether the responsible 
politician is a member of their preferred ideological family or of a rival one (Anduiza et al, 2013). 
As several studies have shown, the stronger the partisan attachment of individuals, the stronger 
their tendency to support their own party and dismiss their opponents (Bartels, 2002; Lavine et al, 
2013; Taber and Lodge, 2006). At the same time, individuals with weaker partisan attachments 
are more likely to change their preferences in the light of new information (Bartels, 2002). 
Likewise, previous work on the influence of an EU membership on support for secession has 
suggested that national identity was a key explanatory variable in explaining independence 
support, and that individuals who identified more strongly with the state or the sub-state unit were 
barely influenced by hypothetical international sanctions (Muro and Vlaskamp 2016).
In accordance with previous research on the relationship between national identity and support for 
independence (Liñeira and Cetrà, 2015), we expect respondents with strong nationalist preferences 
(either pro-secession or pro-host state) to maintain their positions after our primings, even when 
they were faced with an adverse context of increasing costs. A ‘hard version of independence’ 
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scenario that supported the statist views of Spanish or British nationalists (e.g. no international 
support for secession) would thus reaffirm their preferences, and this adverse treatment would be 
ignored as the prospects of international recognition would not alter their preferences towards the 
status quo. The same could be said about staunch Catalan or Scottish nationalists who would see 
a possible unilateral declaration of independence as a ‘once in a lifetime’ opportunity for which it 
was worth paying a hefty cost. For example, during the Scottish campaign the SNP government 
produced optimistic economic predictions that ignored Scotland’s dependence on oil and gas 
revenues to support its public services and neglected the negative implications of the volatility of 
the oil price (Keating, 2017, p.57). Therefore, our expectation was that the political attitudes of 
some electors would remain unaltered, even in the face of currency uncertainty and other 
‘unknowns’, such as EU membership or security provisions (e.g., the relocation of the Scottish-
based Trident nuclear programme). Finally, individuals with a moderate degree of nationalist 
sentiment and dual identities would be more influenced by the adverse scenarios, simply because 
they had weaker preferences regarding the polarizing choice of independence vs status quo. Our 
third hypothesis was:
H3: The stronger (weaker) the degree of nationalist sentiment of the individual, the less 
(more) s/he will be influenced by the information about the prospects of international 
recognition.
Just as the pre-existing intensity of national sentiment was expected to moderate the effects of the 
treatment, so did we also wonder whether the motivations for a pro-secession position would 
influence the impact of the treatments, which was the justification for Hypothesis 4. The existing 
literature makes a distinction between ethno-political, economic, and political-institutional reasons 
to support independence (Emizet and Hesli, 1995; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Alesina and Spolaore, 
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1997). Ethno-politically motivated proponents of secession argue that the host state does not 
provide adequate channels to express the distinctiveness of their nation (language, culture, 
ethnicity, religion, etc.) and that only an independent state can guarantee protection (Breuilly, 
1994; Guibernau, 2006). Economically motivated secessionists hope that a new state will 
guarantee that the nation’s wealth benefits exclusively its own members and that it will no longer 
be lost to ethnic or national groups from poorer regions. Existing evidence confirms the idea that, 
besides having a different identity, relative affluence is also a good predictor for separatism 
(Sambanis and Milanović, 2011; Sorens, 2005). Finally, support for secession may result from the 
perception that an individual lives in an unjust political system (Buchanan, 1991). This alleged 
injustice may be found in an autocratic regime that oppresses its national minorities violently, but 
also in a democratic regime that does not provide sufficient opportunities for the political 
representation of ethnic groups. In these scenarios, secessionists argue that providing the nation 
with a political roof is a remedy to defend the national interests in the long term. In most 
secessionist movements, a combination of these three motivations – ethno-political, economic and 
political-institutional – can be detected, but individuals tend to rank one over the others. 
Finally, we presumed that pro-secession nationalists with ethno-political motivations would be 
only marginally influenced by the prospects of international recognition, as this new information 
did not affect how people identified themselves or how they felt about the treatment of their 
identity. For individuals who were driven by economic or political motivations, however, we 
expected international recognition to be of greater significance. As previously described,  the 
perspective of being a ‘contested state’, or one with limited recognition and a high degree of 
economic and legal insecurity, may shift the economic cost-benefit analysis for individuals who 
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have concerns about the feasibility of the secessionist agenda (Muñoz and Tormos, 2015). Our 
fourth hypothesis therefore was:
H4: Sub-state nationalists who are motivated by ethno-political arguments will be less 
influenced by the information about the prospects of international recognition than sub-
state nationalists who are motivated by economic or political-institutional arguments.
To recapitulate, our hypotheses aimed to confirm the following mechanism: the prospects of 
international recognition typically influence individuals with moderate nationalist preferences as 
well as secessionist-leaning participants who emphasise political and/or economic motivations. By 
contrast, the preferences of staunch pro-secession nationalists, especially those who highlight 
ethno-political motivations, remain unaltered by the additional information provided in the 
vignettes. Similarly, pro-host state nationalists are only marginally influenced by diplomatic 
recognition, as they prefer the status quo in any case above secession. The mechanism is further 
clarified in the following section, where we explain how we embedded an experimental design in 
an opinion survey in order to measure the impact of the international environment on domestic 
preferences for secession. 
SURVEY EXPERIMENT 
A survey experiment is a deliberate manipulation of a survey instrument ‘for purposes of inferring 
how public opinion works in the real world’ (Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk, 2007, pp.3–4). The 
word ‘experiment’ also implies a random assignment of respondents to control and treatment 
conditions. Comparing the judgments and opinions of the respondents in the treatment groups to 
those in the control group reveals the causal effects under investigation. Survey experiments are 
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increasingly used because they are relatively affordable to implement, and because they provide 
grounded inferences about how citizens make decisions and respond to real-world political objects. 
In our case, we wanted to confront respondents with credible scenarios, and could not rely on 
conventional survey data to enhance our understanding of the international dimension of 
secessionist politics. 
We designed and administered a large-scale web survey in May 2014, when both Catalonia and 
Scotland were engaged in intense public debates about their possible independence.i These two 
cases are often compared in the literature on territorial politics because of their numerous 
similarities (Keating, 2001; Guibernau, 2006; Cetrà and Harvey, 2018). In our case, we adopted a 
Most Similar Systems Design, which reduced the number of possible explanations for the outcome 
variable and allowed us to focus on the variation across the cases. Approximately 2,400 
respondents were presented with a list of 38 questions, which they could answer in their preferred 
language (in Catalonia, in either Catalan or Spanish). The sample in both regions was of 1,200 
respondents, which we divided into three representative subgroups of 400 individuals. Each group 
was representative in terms of age, gender and place of residence (in Scotland: council areas; in 
Catalonia: provinces). A survey firm with ample experience in commissioning national and 
international representative surveys administered our survey experiment, which was designed to 
measure how priming affected an opinion or attitude towards state birth. 
The survey experiment randomly assigned respondents alternative versions of questionnaire items. 
In our case, we assigned three different treatments (positive, negative and neutral) to six 
representative samples in Catalonia and Scotland. Our respondents in Catalonia with a positive 
treatment received the scenario below, before they were asked whether they were in favour of a 
unilateral declaration of independence by the Catalan Parliament or not, under the described 
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circumstances. We deliberately used the vague term ‘great powers’, so that respondents could 
interpret it the way they wanted. For European respondents, for example, Germany’s stance on 
this issue is probably more relevant than India’s or China’s. These ‘great powers’ carry the most 
weight in the EU, and their positions would also influence the prospects of EU membership for 
the new state.
‘Spain does not permit the secession of Catalonia, but there is broad international support 
for a unilateral declaration of independence. Several great powers have already declared 
that they would recognise the new state.’
The same applied to the respondents with a negative treatment, who received this vignette: 
‘Spain does not permit the secession of Catalonia, and there is no international support 
for a unilateral declaration of independence. Not a single country has declared that it 
would recognise the new state, and some great powers have already rejected this outright.’
A third control group was used as a reference group and only received the following information:
‘There is also talk about the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence of 
Catalonia by the Catalan parliament. We want to ask you a number of questions about this 
topic.’ 
This control group made it possible to measure the variation between the control subgroup and the 
positive and negative subgroups, as well as to test the impact of the vignettes. 
Before we go any further, it is important to briefly talk about the context in which the survey 
experiment was conducted. Due to space constraints, this description can only be a cursory 
examination of the different political, social and legal situations in the two places (see Muro, 2018 
and  Keating, 2017 for more detailed overviews). In the case of Catalonia, the movement of 
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vindication that advocated for the political-cultural recognition of Catalonia within Spain (e.g., 
Catalanism) was dominant since the transition to democracy in the late 1970s. Secessionism was 
traditionally weak, but gained considerable strength in the late 2000s. Although its strengthening 
coincided with the Great Recession, Cuadras-Morató and Rodon (2017) show that economic 
grievances resulting from the crisis did not play a significant role in changing attitudes towards 
secessionism. Instead, the reasons for its growth are related to the failed process of autonomy 
reform in 2010 (Orriols and Rodon, 2016; Rico and Liñeira, 2014), which was framed by 
nationalist parties as the end of meaningful self-government (Basta, 2018). As Muro explains, the 
independence campaign ‘was originally a bottom-up social movement of extraordinary energy’ 
but ‘elites soon maneuvered to take control’ (Muro, 2018, p.86). At the point when we carried out 
our survey experiment, the regional government had already laid out a road map towards political 
independence. The first step was a consultative referendum on independence, which was scheduled 
for 9 November 2014. In case the Spanish state prevented this referendum from happening, the 
regional government wanted to hold ‘plebiscite’ elections to count how many Catalans would vote 
for independence. If these elections showed that the majority of Catalan voters favoured secession, 
then the required steps toward political independence would be taken, including the possibility of 
a unilateral declaration of independence by the Catalan regional parliament (all three steps 
eventually took place). As the Spanish Constitution does not permit the secession of a part of the 
country’s territory, the Catalan government knew that the two available options were a (very 
unlikely) constitutional reform or unilateral steps. The road ahead was likely to be bumpy, and 
even the Catalan government’s expert group concluded that ‘the recognition and integration in 
international society of a new state is a complex and gradual process which can take years, and 
depends on many political factors as well as legal ones’ (Advisory Council on the National 
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Transition, 2014, p.8). Due to this situation, the Catalan executive put great effort in 
“internationalizing the conflict” and attracting support in the rest of world (e.g. by establishing 
government delegations in eleven countries and training officials for diplomatic service) (Muro, 
2018, p.86). In order to frame their efforts in a broader international context, they referred 
frequently to the referendum in Scotland as an example Spain should follow (the Spanish 
government’s response was that the legal and constitutional situations in Spain and the UK were 
too different to make these cases comparable). The perception of our respondents in Catalonia, at 
that point, was thus that a unilateral declaration of independence was a possibility, but not 
something that was expected to happen within a short time period.
By contrast, the UK government took a different approach to the issue of Scottish independence 
and allowed a referendum that could ‘deliver a fair test and decisive expression of the views of 
people in Scotland and a result that everyone [would] respect’ (United Kingdom Government and 
Scottish Government, 2012, p.3). In October 2012, Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond and UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron signed the Edinburgh Agreement, allowing Scotland to hold an 
independence referendum. Due to this different political and legal context, the Scottish 
government did not have the same need for gathering international support as their Catalan 
counterparts had: unilateral steps were not required if the referendum was won. Given the inherent 
uncertainty of Scottish independence as a proposition, Scottish public opinion concentrated on the 
middle ground, with the largest segment of the population still favouring a third way between 
union and independence. Due to the consensual agreement and the acceptance of the bid for 
independence by the home state, we had to formulate our treatments somewhat differently to make 
remedial action more plausible to Scottish respondents. As a result, the modified positive treatment 
(H1) was:
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‘In the referendum, Scotland votes in favour of independence and the UK is reluctant to 
accept this outcome. There is widespread international support for a unilateral declaration 
of independence. Several great powers have already declared that they would recognise 
the new state.’
The respondents with the negative vignette (H2) received the following: 
‘In the referendum, Scotland votes in favour of independence and the UK is reluctant to 
accept this outcome. There is no international support for a unilateral declaration of 
independence. No country has declared that it would recognise the new state, and some 
have flatly ruled it out.’
Finally, the respondents with a ‘neutral’ treatment received this vignette:
‘In the referendum, Scotland votes in favour of independence and the UK is reluctant to 
accept this outcome.’
[Insert Table 1]
Table 1 (above) shows the support for a unilateral declaration of independence by treatment in 
Catalonia and Scotland. In order to measure the effect of the treatments we ran several logistic and 
treatment effect models that included a series of control variables (see table A.1 in appendix). 
These control variables included the respondent’s gender, age, education level, place of residence, 
language spoken at home (in Catalonia), political orientation on a left-right scale, work situation, 
income level, and whether they had lived outside the country for a period longer than six months. 
We added this final variable because we assumed that respondents who had been exposed to life 
abroad might be more susceptible to changes in the international scenario. 
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For Hypothesis 3, we asked the participants how they identified themselves in terms of national 
belonging to measure their degree of nationalism (Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió, 2015; Scottish 
Referendum Study, 2014). We asked the participants the so-called ‘Linz-Moreno question’ 
(Moreno, 2006), which allows individuals to classify themselves (e.g. in the case of Catalonia) as 
feeling ‘Only Catalan’, ‘More Catalan than Spanish’, ‘Both Catalan and Spanish’, ‘More Spanish 
than Catalan’ or ‘Only Spanish’. The two extremes we defined as representing the highest degree 
of nationalist sentiment. These self-definitions did not overlap with ethnic backgrounds per se, as 
in public both Catalan and Scottish nationalist leaders promote a ‘civic nationalism’ that is also 
open to individuals whose background is outside the region (Mycock, 2012; Serrano, 2013). As 
has been done in comparable studies (Muñoz and Tormos, 2015; Rico and Jennings, 2012), we 
decided to lump together the answers of the two groups of respondents: those who felt more 
‘British than Scottish’ with ‘Only British’, and those who felt more ‘Spanish than Catalan’ with 
‘Only Spanish’. This choice was motivated by a practical and a theoretical reason. The practical 
reason was that very few respondents identified themselves exclusively or predominantly with 
‘Spain’ or ‘Britain’. By combining these two categories, it was possible to obtain a larger sample.ii 
Theoretically, these two groups were merged because we did not expect any significant difference 
in their responses. Guinjoan and Rodon’s (2016) detailed methodological study on the Linz-
Moreno question suggests that, for Catalan identities, the categorical question performs well in 
capturing the intensity of nationalism. This is not the case for Spanish identities, where the mixed 
categories also capture a large degree of Spanish nationalism. This is because, ‘as previous 
research has argued, this may have to do with the strong connections that most Catalan citizens 
make between Spanish identity and right-wing values, which are still seen as rooted in the 
Francoist dictatorship tradition (Dinas, 2012)‘ (Guinjoan and Rodon, 2016, p.139). In Catalonia –
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and we assume the same pattern holds for Scotland – both auto-identifications can therefore be 
interpreted as a sign of a comparably strong bond with the host state.
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we asked our respondents two questions. First, we simply asked the 
respondents what they would vote in a referendum on independence. If they opted in favour of 
secession, we provided them with a list of possible reasons for their choice, among which figured 
ethno-political, economic and political-institutional options. The respondents could choose up to 
three motivations to explain their choice. Using these answers, we could then construct a dummy 
variable ‘use of ethno-political argument’ to distinguish between those respondents that had used 
at least one of these arguments and those who had not (the list of motivations can be found in the 
appendix).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The goal of the web-based survey experiment was to test the extent to which support for a unilateral 
declaration of independence could be mediated by international incentives of recognition (both 
positive and negative). To measure the impact of international threats and payoffs on the 
respondents’ support for secession we estimated the average treatment effect (ATE), a parameter 
that measures the difference in mean outcomes for treated and untreated units. The expression 
‘treatment effect’ is basically the difference between an outcome variable of interest (in our case, 
support for a unilateral declaration of independence) for individuals who were exposed to the 
treatment and individuals who were in the control groups.
Our first hypothesis (H1: International recognition will have a positive effect on support for a 
unilateral declaration of independence) could be confirmed in both Catalonia and Scotland. As 
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can be seen in Figure 1, controlling for all the other variables included in the model, the prospect 
of international recognition after secession had a positive and significant treatment effect on 
support for remedial action, which is often taken in response to a situation of oppression, 
exploitation or domination. In both Catalonia and Scotland the probability grew by nine percent 
points compared to the neutral treatment, and a majority of the respondents supported a unilateral 
declaration of independence under these conditions. The similarity of results in both cases is 
striking, particularly when considering the differences between the legal and political contexts in 
which the hypothetical unilateral declarations of independence of Catalonia and Scotland were set. 
Ultimately, the findings confirm the expectation that domestic support for a unilateral declaration 
of independence will increase when the international context is favourable to state birth.
[Insert Figure 1]
Our second hypothesis (H2: The lack of international recognition will have a negative effect on 
support for a unilateral declaration of independence) could not be confirmed by the randomised 
trial, as indicated in Figure 1. There was no significant decrease in support for a unilateral 
declaration of independence after the negative treatment by comparison with the control group.  
The reason for the lack of effect could be that respondents were affected by real-life events or 
information. For example, the experiment could not isolate respondents from previous negative 
priming during the independence campaign. In the case of Scotland, various actors highlighted the 
political and economic uncertainties that an independent Scotland would face. Former Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown, one of the key spokespersons for the ‘No’ side, argued that ‘Scottish 
sovereignty’ was a ‘19th-century answer to 21st-century challenges’, whereas former US President 
Bill Clinton said he worried that a ‘long, complex negotiating process’ with the UK would weaken 
the Scottish economy. None of the supporters of the Better Together campaign warned of 
Page 21 of 43 Nations and Nationalism
-22-
international ostracism, but they did highlight the economic risks and uncertainties of 
independence (Beasley and Kaarbo, 2018). In addition, the survey experiment could not measure 
if previous events, such as Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 (whose status 
is still contested), had already shaped the attitudes of respondents. According to Bruno Coppetiers, 
‘the recognition of Kosovo by Western governments had a major impact on all secessionist 
conflicts in which external actors have a strong presence’ (2010, p.252) . Especially in the Catalan 
case, due to its different characteristics, the Kosovo example was mentioned repeatedly in televised 
head-to-head debates and the press. For example, the Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Sáenz de 
Santamaria asked publicly whether Catalans wanted to ‘identify themselves with Kosovo, where 
the level of unemployment is at 40 percent and which has a per capita income 25 times smaller 
than that of Catalonia’ (La Vanguardia, 15 March 2013). In other words, the participants of our 
survey experiment could have concluded that the negative treatment was the status quo and did 
not perceive the new information as a ‘game changer’ with Kosovo’s situation in mind. In any 
case, the puzzling absence of any effect of the negative treatment resonates with previous work on 
the prospects of EU membership for secessionist movements, which also observed a similar result 
and explained it by referring to the real-life warnings about possible EU exclusion around the time 
the survey was carried out (Closa, 2016; Keating, 2017). 
Our third hypothesis (H3: The stronger (weaker) the level of nationalism in the individual, the less 
(more) s/he will be influenced by the information about the prospects of international recognition) 
sought to test the extent to which the intensity of nationalism could mediate the impact of our 
treatments. We looked at the average marginal effects – calculated by varying the focal variable 
(in this case the level of nationalism) – while keeping all covariates of our model as they were 
observed. 
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As it can be observed in Figure 2, respondents behaved in accordance with our hypothesised 
expectations that more nationalist individuals were less likely to be influenced by the treatments. 
In both cases, the group ‘feeling more Catalan than Spanish/feeling more Scottish than British’ 
was the most affected subgroup, and support for a unilateral declaration of independence became 
substantially more likely after the positive treatment by comparison with the control group (19 
percent points more in Catalonia, and 23 percent points more in Scotland). Furthermore, in both 
categories, the results after a positive treatment for ‘feeling both Catalan and Spanish/feeling both 
Scottish and British’ were also significant (15 percent points more in Catalonia, and 17 percent 
points more in Scotland). The more nationalist subgroups – both in favour of the seceding region 
and the host state – were not affected by the treatments. There was, admittedly, a ceiling effect for 
these subgroups, as our treatments had no effect on their responses: support for a unilateral 
declaration of independence was above 90 percent for pro-secession nationalists and below 10 
percent for state nationalists in the control group. It is, however, still noteworthy that pro-secession 
nationalists were not influenced by the negative treatments, in the same way that pro-state 
nationalists were not influenced by the positive treatments. The negative treatment had no 
significant influence on any of the subgroups. These results support earlier findings by Muñoz and 
Tormos about the economic drivers of secessionism in Catalonia: individuals with strong identity 
and partisan beliefs were much less influenced by economic arguments than more ‘moderate’ 
individuals (Muñoz and Tormos, 2015).  
[Insert Figure 2]
Hypothesis 4 (H4: Sub-state nationalists who are motivated by ethno-political arguments will be 
less influenced by the information about the prospects of international recognition than sub-state 
nationalists, who are motivated by economic or political-institutional arguments) could also be 
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confirmed. As illustrated in Figure 3, participants who had not used any ethno-political argument 
were the only sub-group that was to a statistically significant degree influenced by the positive 
treatments in both places. In Catalonia, the probability of supporting a unilateral declaration of 
independence grew with 8.1 percent points, compared to the control group. In Scotland, support 
for a unilateral declaration of independence went up by 9 percent points among respondents that 
had not used any ethno-political arguments. In short, these findings suggest a typological 
distinction between those who support secession for ethno-political motivations, on the one hand, 
and those who support secession for ‘economic’ or ‘political-institutional’ reasons, on the other. 
Further operationalisation of these normative types of voters could improve empirical predictions 
on future votes on independence as well as contribute to the ethnic-civic dichotomy in nationalism 
studies (Brubaker, 2004). 
[Insert Figure 3]
CONCLUSION
Secessionist goals are set at the domestic level, but they require international recognition to be 
fully realised. Our findings suggest that having the support of foreign powers increases popular 
support for a unilateral declaration of independence among stateless nations with vigorous 
secessionist movements. International recognition hardens public support for a unilateral 
declaration of independence, but our results also indicate that the impact of international factors is 
not homogeneously distributed among the populations of our relatively affluent case studies. The 
research findings can be summarised in the following three points:
First, the issue of international recognition influenced the opinions of respondents in both 
Catalonia and Scotland. In our survey experiment the positive treatment – broad international 
support for independence – increased support for a unilateral declaration of independence at a 
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statistically significant level. This result was consistent with existing scholarship on the role of 
international recognition offering states ‘an additional instrument with which to promote public 
support for controversial and contested solutions to self-determination conflicts’ (Shelef and Zeira, 
2015, p.19). The negative treatment – no international recognition – did not have a significant 
impact, most probably due to a contamination effect. The survey experiment could not replicate 
lab conditions, which meant that respondents in our sample had already been exposed to negative 
priming in real life. Unionist pundits had previously warned voters about the detrimental 
implications of taking unilateral steps that could result in a break-up. That prior exposure could 
explain why there were minor differences between respondents exposed to our ‘neutral’ and 
‘negative’ treatments, and hence the small variation measured.
Second, the treatment effects were strongly mediated by the respondents’ prior degree of 
nationalist sentiment. The expectation was that individuals with exclusive identities would not 
change their political attitudes towards secession simply because they were exposed to a brief 
priming in an online questionnaire. Indeed, the more nationalist a respondent was, the less likely 
s/he was to be affected by any of our vignettes regarding a possible unilateral declaration of 
independence. However, the truly interesting finding was to identify which individuals were more 
likely to change their cost-benefit analysis according to treatments. Middle-ground voters with 
moderate nationalist beliefs (and shared identities) were significantly more influenced by our 
fictitious scenarios about international recognition affecting their preferences for setting up of a 
new independent state without the consent of the host state. This is an important finding, because 
a majority of electors in both Scotland and Catalonia are risk-averse, have multiple identities and 
favour a third way between union and independence (Liñeira and Cetrà, 2015; Keating and 
McEwen, 2017).
Page 25 of 43 Nations and Nationalism
-26-
Third, the results demonstrated that the pro-secessionist participants driven by economic or 
political-institutional motivations were more likely to be influenced by international incentives 
(both positive and negative) than those participants who had provided ethno-political explanations 
for their choice. The distinction between drivers of secession is well established in the literature 
on nationalism (Emizet and Hesli, 1995; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Alesina and Spolaore, 1997), and 
the underlying logic in our study was to discriminate between individuals who were making ethno-
political arguments about a distinct identity and those who wanted their nation to have more 
political power and/or financial resources. Whereas economic and political disputes can sometimes 
be settled with increasing devolution and additional funding, it is difficult to reach a middle point 
or compromise when the ultimate goal is to have a perfect correspondence between political and 
cultural boundaries (Gellner, 1983, p.1). Ethno-politically driven nationalists were less susceptible 
to the treatments, because their identity concerns were neither positively nor negatively affected 
by the international scenarios provided. Further research is needed to identify how real-world 
actors use and merge these normative arguments in favour of self-determination (Dalle Mulle and 
Serrano, 2018).
While the two case studies under examination allow us to explore the importance of international 
recognition in non-violent territorial disputes, they also raise potential concerns regarding the 
generalisability of our findings. First, it is difficult to argue that the findings may be relevant to 
the whole universe of cases where two entities disagree over the possession or control of land. The 
two relatively affluent case studies are located in Europe, where secessionist movements are more 
concerned about the issue of EU membership than that of international recognition per se. Also, 
the EU is a union of states that has repeatedly stated its support for territorial integrity, democratic 
means and preferences for gradual change, as long as they are agreed by the secessionist region 
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and the host state (Closa, 2016). Second, the findings might not be directly applicable to violent 
and post-conflict contexts, where the citizens are more concerned about the short-term survival of 
their state through military and economic support than long-term recognition. In these cases, the 
material and symbolic support of one powerful patron carries more weight in the domestic 
calculations than the more abstract recognition of the international community (see e.g. 
Transnistria and the Republic of Artsakh [Nagorno Karabakh]). Third, and in a more practical 
sense, it may also be difficult for citizens of secessionist regions in oppressive regimes to gather 
reliable information about the level of international support for their cause. In these cases, sound 
information on the positions of international players may not be easily accessible to domestic 
audiences.
In terms of policy implications, domestic considerations are central in accounting for independence 
support. At the same time, the issue of international recognition can influence domestic support 
for a unilateral declaration of independence, which means that international powers can never be 
fully neutral. Having the support of great powers, the United Nations, or the EU, can create an 
environment in which radical steps are legitimated and ‘political divorces’ are seen as legitimate 
answers to territorial disputes. By contrast, a global scenario that is hostile to maximalist demands 
for self-determination and favours minority rights, shared sovereignty and federal solutions as 
instruments of conflict resolution might reduce the domestic support for a unilateral declaration of 
independence and incentivise secessionists to moderate their political strategy. As Fazal and 
Griffiths remark, ‘these groups are so eager for recognition, they may be especially likely to 
respond to the suggestions of the international community’ (Fazal and Griffiths, 2014, p.110). 
Regardless of the situation, international players are constantly taking sides, either when they 
remain silent and support the status quo, or when they express their preferences for state 
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dissolution. International players who refuse to position themselves on a territorial conflict by 
arguing that they do not want to interfere in a domestic dispute are not washing their hands; they 
are silently supporting the player with more leverage, namely states.
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APPENDIX
Technical Details of the Survey
Geographical scope of the survey: Autonomous Community of Catalonia (Spain) and Scotland 
(United Kingdom). Universe: individuals residing in the area of study older than 18. Size and 
distribution of sample: 1,203 interviews in Catalonia, 1,205 interviews in Scotland. The 
respondents were divided into representative subgroups of 400 individuals, applying the age, 
gender and place of residence quotas (in Catalonia: provinces; in Scotland: council areas). 
Sampling error: for a confidence level of 95.5% (as is usually adopted) and assuming the principles 
of simple random sampling, in the worst-case scenario of maximum uncertainty (p = q = 50%), 
the sampling error corresponding to the data on the total sample is 3.2 percentage points. Method 
of collecting information: online survey, using structured and pre-coded questions. The task was 
carried out by Netquest, using their databank of respondents. The questionnaire was available in 
Spanish and Catalan (Catalonia) or English (Scotland).
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Support for a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Treatment in Catalonia 
and Scotland 
Catalonia Scotland
Pro-Independence NO YES Total NO YES Total
Treatment
Negative 200 198 398 230 171 401
(36.23) (30.41) (33.08) (36.45) (29.79) (33.28)
Control 196 208 404 210 192 402
(35.51) (31.95) (33.58) (33.28) (33.45) (33.36)
Positive 156 245 401 191 211 402
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Table A.1. Motivations to support Yes-vote in independence referendum
Ethno-political motivations Economic and political-institutional
 Catalonia (Scotland) is a separate 
nation of Spain (the UK)
 Only an independent state can 
guarantee the identity and language of 
Catalonia (Scotland) (In the Scottish 
survey without ‘and language’)
 I feel Catalan (Scottish)
 Other (recoded if the motive given by 
the respondent fit in this category)
 The economic situation in Catalonia 
(Scotland) would improve with an 
independent state
 Catalonia (Scotland) would manage its 
financial resources better (e.g. taxes)
 Catalonia (Scotland) would have more 
power to govern its own affairs
 Catalonia (Scotland) could defend its 
interests better in the world
 To promote more powers for Catalonia 
(Scotland) within Spain (the UK) (a 
‘tactical vote’)
 Other (recoded if the motive given by 
the respondent fit in this category)
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Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics
CAT SCOT
Variable Observations M (Std. Dev.) Observations M (Std. Dev.) Min Max
National Id. 1,143 2.25 (0.99) 1,116 2.34 (1.05) 1 4
Female 1,203 1.51 (0.50) 1,205 1.55 (0.50) 1 2
Age (Categories) 1,203 4.59 (1.50) 1,205 4.04 (0.96 1 6
Education 1,159 2.66 (0.80) 1,122 2.50 (0.97) 1 4
Language 1,181 1.87 (0.88) 1 3
Political Discussion 1,203 2.42 (0.90) 1,205 2.67 (0.97) 1 4
Ideology 1,203 3.69 (1.79) 1,205 4.67 (1.77) 0 10
Occupation 1,158 2.31 (1.56) 1,125 1.75 (1.45) 1 6
Personal Income 1,012 3.11 (2.35) 1,104 2.57 (1.89) 1 8
Lived Outside 1,203 1.80 (0.40) 1,205 1.84 (0.37) 1 2
Motivations 1,000 0.91 (0.29) 1,109 0.94 (0.24) 1 2
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Table A.3 Average Marginal Effects for Models in Catalonia and Scotland
Table A.2a: Catalonia
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment (ref. Control)
Negative -0.017 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000
(0.035) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.035)
Positive 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.078** 0.089*** 0.080**
(0.035) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031) (0.035)
Nationalismiii 0.072** 0.074**
National Id. (ref. Both)
(0.031) (0.032)
Only Catalan 0.576*** 0.575***
(0.056) (0.056)




Education -0.035** -0.030 -0.034* -0.031
Language (ref. Both)
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Catalan 0.035 0.184*** 0.034 0.182***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.038) (0.043)
Spanish -0.122*** -0.381*** -0.122*** -0.376***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Political Discussioniv -0.009 -0.024 -0.009 0.044
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.031)
Ideology -0.018** -0.046*** -0.018** -0.045***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Lived Outside 0.064* 0.032 0.063* 0.030
(0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037)
Non-Ethnic Reasons 0.044 0.071 0.059 0.075
(0.050) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054)
No-Nationalist X Positivev 0.129***
(0.046)







Observations 1,203 757 757 757 757
Controlsvi NO YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
Page 38 of 43Nations and Nationalism
-39-
Table A.2b: Scotland
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Treatment (ref. Control)
Negative -0.035 -0.031 -0.028 -0.032 -0.037
(0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040)
Positive 0.060* 0.089** 0.079** 0.089** 0.079**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.036) (0.040)
Nationalismvii 0.050 0.055
National Id. (ref. Both)
(0.033) (0.033)
Only Scottish 0.470*** 0.470***
(0.042) (0.042)




Education 0.025 -0.011 0.024 -0.007
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Political Discussionviii -0.050*** -0.066*** -0.050*** 0.098***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.035)
Ideology -0.043*** -0.057*** -0.043*** -0.057***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Lived Outside 0.068 0.029 0.069 0.025
(0.044) (0.048) (0.044) (0.048)
Non-Ethnic Reasons -0.070 -0.089 -0.080 -0.083
(0.065) (0.077) (0.062) (0.078)
No-Nationalist X Positiveix 0.110**
(0.052)






Observations 1,205 846 846 846 846
Controlsxi NO YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
i We acknowledge that the idea of a unilateral declaration of independence was a less credible scenario in Scotland 
than in Catalonia. However, as the remainder of this paper shows, the results were very similar in both cases hence 
confirming the validity of our priming.
ii Feeling ‘More Spanish than Catalan’ had 82 observations, and feeling ‘Only Spanish’ had 47 observations. By 
combining these two categories we had 129 observations, which represented 11.28 percent of our respondents. In 
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Scotland, ‘more British than Scottish’ had 96 observations, and ‘Only British’ 102 observations. Together, they 
represented 17.7 percent of the respondents. 
iii This is a dummy category constructed from national self-identification for simplification purposes in the 
interactions.
iv This variable is treated as continuous (4 categories) in all models except for Model 5, where for the sake of 
simplification for the three-way interaction it is treated as a dummy variable.
v Results of the Interactions are the Average Marginal Effects compared to control group.
vi Controls are: Gender, Age, Occupation, Region and Personal Income.
vii This is a dummy category constructed from national self-identification for simplification purposes in the 
interactions.
viii This variable is treated as continuous (4 categories) in all models except for Model 5, where for the sake of 
simplification for the three-way interaction it is treated as a dummy variable.
ix Results of the Interactions are the Average Marginal Effects compared to control group.
x Note that as opposed to Catalonia, this is a three-way interaction with ‘Discussion’.
xi Controls are: Gender, Age, Occupation, Region and Personal Income.
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Figure 1: Average treatment effects on support for unilateral of independence in Catalonia and Scotland with 
95% CIS. 
305x203mm (72 x 72 DPI) 
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Figure 2: Average marginal treatment effects on support for unilateral of independence in Catalonia and 
Scotland by national identity with 95% CIS. 
294x196mm (72 x 72 DPI) 
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Figure 3: Average marginal treatment effects on support for unilateral of independence in Catalonia and 
Scotland by motivations with 95% CIS. 
294x196mm (72 x 72 DPI) 
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